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As network attacks have increased in number and severity over
the past few years, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) have be-
come a necessary addition to the security infrastructure of most
organizations. These systems are software or hardware schemes
that automate the process of monitoring events that occur in a
computer system or network and analyzing them for signs of
security problems (Crothers, 2003; Bace and Mell, 2001).
Deploying highly effective IDS systems is extremely chal-
lenging. For instance until an IDS is properly tuned to a spe-
ciﬁc environment, there will be thousands of alerts generated
daily. Although most of these alerts are incorrect and thusa (H. Altwaijry), sagarny@
y. Production and hosting by
Saud University.
lsevierare false alerts, it is not obvious whether the alert is positive
or negative until they have been investigated. There have been
many techniques proposed to lessen these false alerts and im-
prove the performance of the system. Agarwal and Joshi
(2000) used a two-stage general-to speciﬁc framework for
learning a rule-based model (PNrule). This model can classify
models of a data set that has widely different class distribu-
tions in the training data set. Levin (2000) used a data-mining
tool for classiﬁcation of data and prediction of new cases using
automatically generated decision trees. In this paper will show
that the use of Bayesian probability is very promising in reduc-
ing the false positive alert rate.
Bayesian probability is an interpretation of the probability
calculus which holds that the concept of a probability can be
deﬁned as the degree to which a person (or community) be-
lieves that proposition is true. Currently Bayesian theory is
used in email spam-ﬁlters (Grapham, 2004; Issac et al., 2009;
Alkabani et al., 2006), Speech recognition (Chien et al.,
2006), Pattern Recognition (Shi and Manduchi, 2003), and
Intrusion Detection (Kruegel et al., 2003; Cemerlic et al.,
2008; Mehdi et al., 2007).
2. Bayesian theory
Bayesian theory is named after Thomas Bayes (1702–1761), his
theory can be explained as follows:
2 H. Altwaijry, S. AlgarnyIf the events A1,A2, . . . and An constitute a partition of the
sample space S such that P(Ak) „ 0 for k= 1,2 , . . . ,n, then for
any event B such that P(B) „ 0 :
PðAijBÞ ¼ PðAi \ BÞ
PðBÞ ¼
PðAiÞPðBjAiÞPn
k¼1 PðAkÞPðBjAkÞ
¼ PðAiÞPðBjAiÞ
PðBÞ
In recent years Bayesian networks have been used across a
wide range of ﬁelds in computer science (Darwiche et al.,
2010) because of their ability to obtain a coherent result from
probabilistic information about a situation. Additionally there
are many efﬁcient algorithms that can be used to derive the re-
sults from the information. It is believed that this ability and
readily available algorithms would allow one to construct an
efﬁcient IDS system.
3. KDD-99 dataset
To test our IDS system we used the DARPA KDD99 Intrusion
Detection Evaluation dataset (KDD99, 1999). This dataset was
created by Lincoln Laboratory at MIT and was used in The
Third International Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining
Tools Competition, which was held in conjunction with
KDD-99 The Fifth International Conference on Knowledge Dis-
covery and Data Mining (KDD99, 1999). This dataset is one of
the most realistic publicly available sets that include actual at-
tacks (Aickelin et al., 2007). Therefore, researchers have been
using this dataset to design and evaluate their intrusion detec-
tion systems. Additionally a common dataset allows research-
ers to compare experimental results. The KDD data set was
acquired from raw tcpdump data for a length of nine weeks.
It is made up of a large number of network trafﬁc activities
that include both normal and malicious connections. The
KDD99 data set includes three independent sets; ‘‘whole
KDD’’, ‘‘10% KDD’’, and ‘‘corrected KDD’’. In our experi-
ments we have used the ‘‘10% KDD’’ and the ‘‘corrected
KDD’’ as our training and testing set, respectively. Table 1
summarizes the number of samples in each dataset:
The training set contains a total of 22 training attack types.
Additionally the ‘‘corrected KDD’’ testing set includes an
additional 17 attack types. Therefore there are 39 attack types
that are included in the testing set and these attacks can be
classiﬁed into one of the four main classes;
 DOS: Denial of Service attacks.
 Probe: another attack type sometimes called Probing.
 U2R: User to Root attacks.
 R2L: Remote to Local attacks.
DoS and Probe attacks are different from the normal trafﬁc
data and can be easily separated from normal activities since
they come with greater frequency in a short period of time. On
the other hand, U2R and R2L attacks are embedded in the data
portions of the packets and normally involve only a singleTable 1 Basic characteristics of the KDD 99 intrusion detection da
Dataset Normal DoS Pr
Whl KDD 972,780 3,883,370 41
10% KDD 97,278 391,458 41
KDD corr 60,593 229,853 41connection. It becomes difﬁcult to achieve satisfactory detection
accuracy for detecting these two attacks (Lee et al. (1999)).
The KDD-99 network TCP connections have 41-features
per connection (record). These features can be divided into
four categories (Chou, 2007):
Basis features: Features 1-9 are the basic features that are
derived from packet header without inspecting the payload.
Content features: Domain knowledge is used to assess the
payload of the original TCP packets. This includes features
such as the number of failed login attempts.
Time-based trafﬁc features: These are features that capture
properties that mature over a 2-s temporal window. An exam-
ple is the number of connections to the same host over the 2-s
interval.
Host-based trafﬁc features: These features utilize a historical
window estimated over the number of connection instead of
time. They are designed to assess attacks, which span intervals
longer than 2s.
4. Bayesian ﬁlter
The Bayesian IDS is built out of a naı¨ve Bayesian classiﬁer.
The classiﬁer is anomaly based. It works by recognizing that
features have different probabilities of occurring in attacks
and in normal TCP trafﬁc. The ﬁlter is trained by giving it clas-
siﬁed trafﬁc. It will then adjust the probabilities for each fea-
ture. After training, the ﬁlter will calculate the probabilities
for each TCP connection and classify it as either normal
TCP trafﬁc or an attack. Therefore our Bayesian ﬁlter consists
of the following two components:
4.1. Training engine
Fig. 1 shows the block diagram for the Bayesian ﬁlter that is
constructed for the IDS system. For each input record there
is a label describing the type of connection. We use this label
to train the engine as following:
 First the number of good records and bad records in the
training dataset are calculated.
 Then two hash tables are created; the ﬁrst one includes the
frequency of each attribute for normal records, and the sec-
ond one includes the frequency of each attribute of the not
normal records.
 Finally, a third hash table is created. This table contains
each attribute from the normal and not normal records
and it is scored using the following formula
where
 B is the frequency of that attribute in the hash table related
to not-normal ﬁle.
 G the frequency of that attribute in the hash table related to
normal ﬁle.tasets in terms of number of samples.
obing R2L U2R Total
,102 1126 52 4,898,430
07 1126 52 494,020
66 16,189 228 311,029
Normal 
Attack 
Training  
Engine 
Database for Testing 
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Inputs Outputs 
Figure 1 The training engine.
Table 2 Number of records used in experiments.
Experiment Type Number Type Number
Experiment 1 Normal 65,593 All Attacks 401,195
Experiment 2 Normal 92,827 DOS 280,504
Experiment 3 Normal 92,827 Probing 4107
Experiment 4 Normal 92,827 U2R 188
Experiment 5 Normal 92,827 R2L 1126
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After training the engine, it is tested by loading the KDD cor-
rected dataset. The following formula is applied to obtain a
probability of whether the record is normal or not where
 n: number of attributes that we need to use to test the
required record
 score(i): the score of the attribute
The record is considered to be an attack if the P(record) is
greater than a speciﬁed threshold.
5. Experimental setup
Many experiments were conducted until we ﬁnally achieved re-
sults that are comparable to what has been published in the lit-
erature. In this section, the most important experiments will be
explained. Experiments differ basically in the training data
used to build the database, which accordingly affects the accu-
racy of the test. Additionally, the number of features and level
of threshold used in the testing engine makes a big difference in
the results. Therefore, all experiments presented differ due to
manipulation of the following inputs: training data, features
and threshold.
5.1. Training data
Using the 10% KDD data set we have 494,020 records that
can be used to train the training engine. These training records
consist of normal (non attack) records and known attack re-
cords distributed among the four attacks types: DoS, Probe,
U2R and R2L. In all the experiments that we will present we
will use the normal records (non attack), adding to them the
appropriate not-normal (attack) records. In each experiment,
we select one type of not-normal record, except for the ﬁrst
experiment, in which all types of records were used. The objec-
tive of varying between not-normal records in each experiment
is to see the effect of each different attack on the results. This
method of altering the attack type in each experiment shows
some interesting results (see experiment 5), as the detection
rate of U2R attacks was higher when using R2L records to
train the engine than when using U2R (see Experiment 4).
5.2. Features
Since the data record consists of 41 features, we can select be-
tween them and perform a very large number of combinations.
We have selected the features as follows:
1. Using speciﬁc features like basic features (1–9), content
features (10–22) and trafﬁc features (23–31)2. Using all the 41 features.
3. Using selected features by inspecting the score map.
The experiments performed show that the ﬁrst method does
not yield good results compared to the second method. How-
ever, the results from using all features are worse than results
previously published. Consequently, it was necessary to ﬁnd
key features that can lead to better results. To do so, we ana-
lyzed the score map that was built by the training engine to see
the highest value that can result in a score that is above the
threshold so that the detection rate maybe increased. Among
the many features and after many experiments, we ended up
with three features that raised the detection rate of R2L attack
to 85% as will be explained in Experiment 5.
5.3. Threshold
This is the level that we used to distinguish between normal re-
cords and attacks. The threshold value was adjusted between
the experiments to increase the detection rate.
After performing each experiment, we analyzed the results
based upon the number of normal and not-normal records that
the testing engine succeeded or failed in classifying. We use the
following expressions to analyze the data:
True negative (TN): The percentage of valid records that
are correctly classiﬁed.
True positive (TP): The percentage of attack records that
are correctly classiﬁed.
False positive (FP): The percentage of records that were
incorrectly classiﬁed as attacks whereas in fact they are valid
activities.
False negative (FN): The percentage of records that were
incorrectly classiﬁed as valid activities whereas in fact they
are attacks.
6. Results
Each of the following ﬁve experiments consists of ﬁve sub-
experiments. However, we categorize them into ﬁve main
experiments since we use the same training engine to perform
the ﬁve sub-experiments. For example, using the normal and
not-normal records in the training engine for the ﬁrst group
of experiments, we test not-normal records, DOS, Probing,
U2R and R2L. Each test has its own setup in terms of features
and threshold. Table 2 summarizes the records used in training
the Bayesian ﬁlter for all ﬁve experiments
6.1. Experiment 1: using all attack records and normal (non-
attack) records
Table 3 shows what was used for each test in this experiment,
after the Bayesian ﬁlter had been trained using 65,593 normal
Table 3 Experiment 1 testing environment.
Testing data No of records Features Threshold
Normal 60,593 All 0.9
Not Normal 250,436 All 0.9
DOS 165,299 All 0.9
Probing 4166 All 0.9
U2R 188 All 0.9
R2L 16,180 All 0.9
Table 4 Test results percentages.
Test TN TP FN FP DR CR
All attacks 99.03 89.70 0.97 10.30 89.70 94.37
DOS 99.03 99.36 0.97 0.64 99.36 99.20
Probing 99.03 57.15 0.97 42.85 57.15 78.09
U2R 99.03 0.00 0.97 100.00 0.00 49.52
R2L 99.03 0.00 0.97 100.00 0.00 49.52
Table 5 Experiment 2 testing environment.
Testing data No of records Features Threshold
Normal 60,593 All 0.9
All attacks 250,436 All 0.9
DOS 165,299 All 0.9
Probing 4166 23,24,31 0.6
U2R 188 23,24,31 0.6
R2L 16,180 23,24,31 0.6
Table 6 Experiment 2 test result percentages.
Test TN TP FN FP DR CR
All attacks 99.60 65.50 0.40 34.50 65.50 82.55
DOS 99.60 99.24 0.40 0.76 99.24 99.42
Probing 99.60 17.73 0.40 82.27 17.73 58.67
U2R 99.60 0.00 0.40 100.00 0.00 49.80
R2L 99.60 0.00 0.40 100.00 0.00 49.80
Table 7 Experiment 3 testing environment.
Testing data No of records Features Threshold
Normal 60,593 All 0.9
All attacks 250,436 All 0.9
DOS 165,299 All 0.9
Probing 4166 All 0.9
U2R 188 23,24,31 0.6
R2L 16,180 23,24,31 0.6
Table 8 Experiment 3 test result percentages.
Test TN TP FN FP DR CR
Not normal 99.40 71.00 0.60 29.00 71.00 85.20
DOS 99.40 70.30 0.60 29.70 70.30 84.85
Probing 99.40 81.90 0.60 18.10 81.90 90.65
U2R 99.40 91.50 0.60 8.50 91.50 95.45
R2L 99.40 61.50 0.60 38.50 61.50 80.45
Table 9 Experiment 4 testing environment.
Testing data No of records Features Threshold
Normal 60,593 All 0.9
Not normal 250,436 23,24,31 0.6
DOS 165,299 All 0.6
Probing 4166 23,24,31 0.6
U2R 188 23,24,31 0.6
R2L 16,180 23,24,31 0.6
Table 10 Experiment 4 test result percentages.
Test TN TP FN FP DR CR
Not normal 99.70 76.50 0.30 23.50 76.50 88.10
DOS 99.70 0.02 0.30 99.98 0.02 49.86
Probing 99.70 71.60 0.30 28.40 71.60 85.65
U2R 99.70 93.00 0.30 7.00 93.00 96.35
R2L 99.70 61.50 0.30 38.50 61.50 80.60
4 H. Altwaijry, S. Algarnyrecords and 401,195 attack records. We then performed ﬁve
tests on the trained network to see the effects on each attack
type. Normal records were used in all tests and each test used
one attack at a time. For example, the ﬁrst test in the experi-
ment used 60,593 normal records and 250,436 not-normal
records.
FromTable 4, we can see that normal records were detected
with high accuracy = 99.03%, while the best detection ratewas for the DOS attack type which had 99.36% accuracy while
the worst results were for U2R, and R2L attacks with 0%. The
overall detection rate did not reﬂect the actual accuracy of the
ﬁlter if the TP rate was low, as in U2R and R2L.
6.2. Experiment 2: using DOS records and normal (non-attack)
records
Table 5 shows what was used to test the Bayesian ﬁlter for the
second experiment. While in Table 6, we can see that normal
records were detected with high accuracy: TN = 99.6%. The
best DR was for the DOS attack type, which was 99.24%, as
expected since it was trained using only DOS attacks, and
the worst result was for U2R and R2L attacks with 0%. The
overall DR did not reﬂect the actual accuracy of the ﬁlter if
the TP rate was low as in U2R and R2L.
6.3. Experiment 3: using Probing records and normal records
Table 7 shows what was used to test the Bayesian ﬁlter for the
third experiment. While Table 8, shows that normal records
are detected with high accuracy: TN = 99.4%.The best accu-
racy was for the U2R attack type, which was 91.5% although
the training data was using PROBING attacks.
By analyzing the features, it is found that U2R and R2L
attacks can be detected with a better rate if selected features
are chosen. These features are 23(count), 24(serror_rate) and
31(Srv_diff_host_rate).
Table 11 Experiment 5 testing environment.
Testing data No of records Features Threshold
Normal 60,593 All 0.9
Not normal 250,436 All 0.9
DOS 165,299 All 0.9
Probing 4,166 23,24,31 0.6
U2R 188 23,24,31 0.6
R2L 16,180 23,24,31 0.6
Table 12 Experiment 5 test result percentages.
Test TN TP FN FP DR CR
Not normal 68.03 10.00 31.97 90.00 10.00 39.02
DOS 68.03 2.00 31.97 98.00 2.00 35.02
Probing 68.03 63.60 31.97 36.40 63.60 65.82
U2R 68.03 96.30 31.97 3.70 96.30 82.17
R2L 68.03 85.35 31.97 14.65 85.35 76.69
Table 13 Detection rate for various algorithms.
Algorithm DOS Probe U2R R2l
KDD cup winner 97.10 83.30 12.30 8.40
SOM map 95.10 64.30 22.90 11.30
Gaussian classiﬁer 82.40 90.20 22.80 9.60
K-means clustering 97.30 87.60 29.80 6.40
Nearest clustering 97.10 88.80 2.20 3.40
Radial basis 73.00 93.20 6.10 5.90
C4.5 decision tree 97.00 80.80 1.8 4.6
PN-rule 6.60 10.70
Linear GP 96.70 85.70 1.30 9.30
Online k-means 69.81 99.62 49.45 6.48
SVM 99.90 67.31 0.00 29.09
KMO+SVM 75.76 99.61 49.45 22.24
Backpropagation 97.23 96.63 87.71 30.97
Bayesian based intrusion detection system 56.4. Experiment 4: using U2R records and normal records
Table 9 shows what was used to test the Bayesian ﬁlter for the
fourth experiment. While Table 10, shows that normal records
were detected with high accuracy: TN = 99.7%. The best DR
was for the U2R attack type which was 93.0% and the worst
result was for DOS attacks with 0.02%. Also in this experi-
ment, like the previous one, attacks show sensitivity if using
features 23, 24 and 31.
6.5. Experiment 5: using L2R records and normal records
Table 11 shows what was used to test the Bayesian ﬁlter for the
ﬁfth experiment. While Table 12, shows that normal records
accuracy decreased to 68.03% since the threshold value was
decreased to improve the TP for R2L. The best DR was for
the U2R attack type which was 96.3% although the training
data used the R2L type. The worst result was for DOS attacks
with 2%. Also in this experiment, like the previous two exper-
iments, showed sensitivity to using features 23, 24 and 31.
The previous ﬁve experiments showed that by tweaking se-
lected features it is possible to achieve high accuracy for all
four types of attacks.The results obtained by using Bayesian ﬁlters are compra-
ble to what has been presented in Chou’s PhD thesis (Chou,
2007) where he reported the results of most algorithms (Table
13). However, Bayesian ﬁlters were able to achieve superior
results for in detecting U2R and R2L attacks.
7. Conclusions
Since the goal of this research was to improve the accuracy of
the R2L attack using Bayesian methods, we have succeeded in
achieving our target by using the Bayesian method as an en-
gine to classify the data accordingly. We achieve results supe-
rior to Chou in his PhD dissertation (Chou, 2007), where he
achieved a DR of 69.82% for the R2L. Our research results
show that we could have better results for R2L attack with a
DR of 85.35% by using the three features: 23, 24 and 31 and
a threshold value of 0.6. However, the CR which equals
76.69% is considered low comparing to Chou result because
we used a low threshold value which reduces the accuracy of
detection of normal records (TN) but increases the DR for
R2L attack. To improve the accuracy of an IDS system we
propose that we should use several Bayesian ﬁlters in parallel
with each ﬁlter optimized to detect one type of record; this
can be a good subject for further research in this ﬁeld.
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